

The attached information was taken primarily from manually recorded notes during communications connected with the high-jacking of Northwest Airlines Flight 305, November 24/25, 1971.

The primary method of communication with the flight was direct between MSPFO (Flight Operations) and SEADD (Flight Dispatch), the flight, SEA and SFO ARINC, RNO Tower.

Due to the inability to copy everything exactly--and as rapidly--as it occurred, there may be some errors in the following. It is not believed that they are likely to be large or significant.

The following also includes additional information that developed during the incident that appeared relevant.

11/25/71

~~HIGH-JACKING, NWA FLIGHT 305, NOVEMBER 24/75, 1211~~

The following information is from various sources, primarily the radio and phone-patch communications between the MSP Flight Operations Office "Eagle" line and the flight crew.

Time (CST)\*

1658  
2:58 P.M.  
PST

Flight OFF PDX. High-jacker (HJ) apparently made his demands known shortly after this time.

Preliminary information received from MSP Planning Office (MSPPO):

HJ demanding \$200,000 (denomination not restricted), 2 chest-pack parachutes, 2 back-pack parachutes. All to be available and ready at airplane parking site before landing will be permitted at SEA.

Apparently has a bomb in briefcase. Passenger apparently boarded at PDX.

1720\*  
3:20 P.M.  
PST

Crew advised they would hold over Lofall intersection until all material available. No info yet on destination HJ desired after SEA T.O. HJ had said there was to be no "funny stuff" at any time or he would detonate the bomb. Specified that only the fuel truck, air-stair truck, and automobile with the money and 'chutes approach the airplane. The airplane be parked in an "isolated" position. Gave a deadline of 1900 CST for all demands to be met. HJ remained in tourist cabin with one stewardess sitting next to him and aware of what appeared to be a bomb (dynamite sticks, wire, battery). Passengers not advised that high-jacking in progress, but that reason for the holding was "minor mechanical problem".

Crew described passenger as white, 6' 1", black hair, 175#, approximately 50, black suit, black rain coat, black brief case. (All information between cockpit and HJ being relayed by "captive" stewardess Mucklow by cabin/cockpit interphone.)

HJ specified that no vehicles with beacons or flashing red lights or any other were to approach airplane. MSPFO agreed that captain was in full command and all his requests and wishes would be honored. Crew taking pains likewise to gain HJ's confidence by giving him full information and cooperation.

HJ also specified that, after SEA landing and parking:

- Fueling to start as soon as <sup>- 136 -</sup> engines shut down.
- Stewardess Mucklow would leave airplane (and only her) and pick up money, then return for 'chutes. He must ~~communicate~~ with money before any other steps taken.

1930\*

Airplane landed SEA after crew and HJ assured that money and 'chutes were available and in position.

Crew requested car park at 10 to 11 o'clock position to airplane so they could see it properly.

Notes indicate HJ indicated at one time that airplane was open to "any number of vehicles as long as no 'funny stuff' pulled."

Direct communications between crew and MSPFO maintained at all times. Coordination between Tower, vehicles, and airplane on ground at SEA were on Ground Control frequency 121.7.

First fuel truck apparently ran out of fuel. Crew requested second truck, with third one to be standing by. Considerable delay in getting full load of fuel and HJ was getting "nervous", saying that you must "get the show on the road".

HJ specified that he wanted to go to Mexico City non-stop, that the aircraft configuration must be gear DOWN, flaps at 15°, that the aft entry door must be open at all times, and that the aft stairs be extended after take-off. Later specified that stairs must be fully extended before take-off. MSPFO advised crew (1) that non-stop SEA-MEX impossible with gear DOWN, flaps 15°, (2) that take-off with air-stairs full down impossible due to inability to rotate airplane. When HJ advised of this he asked that air-stairs be partially extended prior to take-off. MSPFO advised this also impossible since stairs could not be held in any intermediate position.

HJ had previously stated that no landing within continental U.S. would be permitted "for fuel or anything else". When advised of range limitation in his specified configuration, he agreed to something short of the border. Asked about PHX. Advised by MSPFO that this might be within range but that RNO would be better as far as range was concerned. Agreed to this without much, if any, objection.

2136 Airplane OFF at SEA.

7:36 P.M. PST

2140

7:40 P.M. PST 14 DME S SEA VOR at 7000'. Gear DOWN, flaps extending to 30°.

2141\*

7:41 P.M. PST

Stewardess Mucklow allowed to go to cockpit.

2142\*

7:42 P.M. PST

HJ advised (by inter-phone) that he was having difficulty getting steps down.

2143

7:43 P.M. PST

Aft air-stair warning light ON (stairs apparently now partially extended.) Crew had been furnished Boeing procedure for extending stairs in flight. Airplane now 19 DME S SEA VOR on V23, flaps at 30°, and at APPROACH speed.

N/A Chief Performance Engineer had been called to field to help calculate range, etc. Boeing Company had been contacted for assistance in range problem, flight characteristics with air-stairs extended, whether opening (stairs extend about 20° in flight, possibly more with man's weight on them) would be large enough for a man to exit. Boeing assured us there would be no controllability problem, that they would get experts working on range problem also, that they had dropped 2-300# boxes out air-stair opening in flight and that man could probably get out.

N/A Communications people also had arrived at field to assist in required 'phone-patching, other communications problems.

Mr. Nyrop, Mr. Hardesty, Mr. Criggs, four supervisory pilots, 1 performance engineer, many others on the scene (MSPFO) for assistance.

2145\*  
7:45 P.M.  
PST

Flight at 7000', 160KIAS, fuel flow (FF) 4500#/engine, flaps 30° gear DOWN. MSPFO advised they would have even more severely limited range in the flaps 30° position. Crew given preliminary information on optimum range IAS (170K), weather, airports available between SLA and RNO, minimum obstruction clearance altitudes, etc.

2155  
7:55 P.M.  
PST

MSPFO asked for stewardess best recollection of exact content of HJ briefcase. She got on radio and gave following basic information:

- Eight red sticks, about 6" x 1" in left corner of brief case, "look like big firecrackers." Two rows of sticks, four on top of four.
- Wire attached to dynamite with red insulation.
- Battery "like flashlight battery, but about 6" high and as big around as my arm".
- Red sticks are about the color "of my uniform".

2205\*  
8:05 P.M.  
PST

Crew called HJ and asked him if everything was O.K. and he replied that it was. This was apparently the last communication the crew had with the I.J.

2210\*  
8:10 P.M.  
PST

Crew reported oscillation of cabin rate of climb indicator. This probably due to HJ weight now on stairs, stairs extending further, resultant effect on cabin pressure. May be best estimate of when he exited airplane.

MSPFO advised crew that range to RNO now looked good (airplane now at 10,000', 170K, gear DOWN, flaps 15°, FF 4000#/hour/engine, TAT -7°C. MSPFO calculated TAS and range from this data.

Cabin lights ON in forward cabin, OFF in aft cabin. Curtain between first class and tourist section was closed; crew could not see whether HJ was still aboard.

2222\*

8:22 PM  
PST

Lost communications on NNA communications frequency (131.9); 'phone-patch with SEA ARINC established. Flight now 23 DME S PDX at 10,000', 40,000% fuel aboard, 165KIAS, FF and configuration remained the same. Crew had previously been advised to switch to ARINC on 131.8 when NNA communications lost. MSPFO and MSPFD communicated with flight and SEA ARINC thereafter on this 'phone-patch arrangement. SEADD had been monitoring all communications with flight and assisting in all other matters.

SEA "Chief Pilot", Director of Flying, Western Region Al Lee had also been very actively participating throughout the high-jacking. He had taken money and 'clutes to airplane at SEA, coordinated with crew, fuel trucks, etc.

Captain Lee later called UAL at RNO and briefed them on all of the HJ's demands, procedures to be followed at RNO, etc.

2252

8:52 PM  
PST

Flight over EUC VOR, 10,000', 170KIAS, fuel aboard 33,500%, FF and configuration remained the same. Advised that they had had no communications with the HJ for "about the last 55 minutes" despite several attempts on cockpit-to-cabin inter-phone and PA system. Crew was assured that fuel was more than adequate to get to RNO, that RNO weather was good, etc. SEADD had also been actively following and participating in these events.

2328

9:28 PM  
PST

Over MFR, 10,000', TAT -5°, 170KIAS, fuel aboard 27,500%, FF and configuration the same. Some airframe icing being experienced. Engine anti-icing ON for appreciable length of time, wing AI on "intermittently". Crew seemed slightly concerned about this, but were assured that it was no problem.

2330\*

9:30 PM  
PST

Ken Parsch (FAA Air Transportation Security Officer at MSP; coordinator for all Air Marshals on NNA) asked that we suggest that flight crew slowly lower cabin temperature as much as practicable (to slow HJ's reflexes).

2335\*

9:35 PM  
PST

MSPFO suggested a slow climb to 11,000' at Captain's discretion, to induce as much hypoxia in HJ as possible (flight had previously been suggested to consider climb to as high as practicable--but that they would probably be performance limited to not much above 17,000'--but not above 12,500'. Latter upper limit to prevent a cabin oxygen mask drop from exciting HJ. 11,000' also needed for adequate terrain clearance RBL-RNO.

2342  
9:42 PM  
PST  
When flight was in RBL area, direct communications between MSPFO and the flight were interrupted. UAL 4331 and WAL 328 relayed messages to and from the flight for us.

2347  
9:47 PM  
PST  
0005  
10:05 PM  
PST  
Flight now at 11,000', TAT -1°, all other factor essentially the same.  
58 DME N RBL VOR, 11,000', fuel aboard 22,000#. Only evidence from cabin was aft entry door and air-stair warning lights still ON.

0030  
10:30 PM  
PST  
0017  
10:37 PM, PST  
Flight switched to SFO ARINC on 130.6. MSPFO put on 'phone-patch this frequency at same time.  
Fuel aboard 17,300#.

0039\*  
10:39 PM, PST  
0049  
10:49 PM  
PST  
0100  
11:00 PM  
PST  
Descent from 11,000 to 9,000' started.  
Flight advised they were holding at RNO OM until they had everything "in order".  
Flight 1 mile out on final approach. (At this time, we-- MSPFO--were on telephone conference call. Other parties apparently on the same line were RNO Tower, FAA SEA, FAA Washington, FBI Washington. Not known whether anyone else might have also been tuned in.)

0101  
11:01 PM  
PST  
Tower "talked us through" his touchdown, subsequent taxiing. Door did not appear to go to full down position until relatively low speed on roll-out. Flaps appeared to be "UP". Parked at NE (?) corner of terminal ramp.

0116  
11:16 PM  
PST  
Unknown  
Tower reported crew had exited airplane; with FBI at this time.  
After parking, crew had advised on SFO ARINC that one of them had gone back in cabin and found no sign of HJ. They had apparently last tried to contact him via interphone/PA at about 0046CST with no response. At that time they were going to advise him that the air-stair would have to be retracted for landing or that damage during landing roll-out would probably prevent subsequent take-off.  
Two "little" 'chutes gone, one "big" one cut up, apparently to tie the money with shroud lines to HJ. One "big" 'chute apparently still on the airplane.  
Guard requested around airplane, FBI apparently searching airplane.  
Was advised (all on conference call) at this time that

At some point during the conference call, learned (it is not known from who) that a Ted Mayfield operated a parachute jumping school at Donald, Oregon, and that he had previously been convicted of armed robbery.

0133 NWAFO advised conference call participants that NWA would hang up if they were no longer needed on that line. Was asked to standby by either FAA or FBI Washington. Did so.  
11:33 PM  
PST

0135 FAA/FBI advised NWAFO that no further conference call info was required of NWA at that time. Hung up. (Prior to our hanging up, Ken Parsch advised FAA Washington on same line that he also was "signing off".)  
11:35 PM  
PST

Throughout the flight from the time it was known that the HJ's desired destination was MEX, preparations were made for a landing at YUM, and Mazatlan, Mexico, as would have been necessary due to the limited range in the HJ's specified configuration. Prior to the RNO landing, NWAFO suggested that crew negotiate with HJ to pull gear and flaps UP after RNO take-off, that a non-stop flight to MEX would then be possible. This, of course, proved unnecessary.

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(P): confirmation on it.

(GC): I see.

(GC): Northwest 305 ground.

(GC): 305 ground.

(GC): Northwest 305 ground.

(P): AL

(GC): Can you give me an ETD roughly?

(P): AL, we're ready to have the stairs removed if you want to advise the individual. We'll see if we can get it detached from here.

(GC): Okay. You call me back when you want your stairs towed away, okay?

(P): Alright we're going to try to give an official signal. We're ready to have the stairs removed right now.

(GC): Okay, I'll go up and get them.

(P)(?): Okay, AL, I think he's got the message there.

(GC): 305 this is AL again.

(GC): Northwest 305 ground

(GC): 305 go ahead

(GC)(?): AL, we checked on altitude here in Reno and the minimum obstruction altitude is 15,000.

(P): AL, okay, it's 15,000, huh?

(GC): Yeh, that's what we show here. The first league is 15,000 going J-5.

(P): Well we may have to go down the coast and come in from another route possibly. Let us check with the company here. We're about ready to crank if we can get some, he says let's get the show  
- 186 - here and we want to, we'll



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(P): have to pick a flight plan in the air. You get us headed the general direction; put us southerly out over the, somewhat along the coast.

(GC): Okay, we'll start you out here heading toward Portland and then we'll get your clearance cornered.

(P): Okay, fine and we've got the company working on the clearance so, or excuse me, on the flight plan so if we don't answer you right away we're trying to work a couple of free frequencies; the company, you and our friend in the aft end here.

(GC): That's okay. We'll listen to your company freak too so we can tell when you're busy.

(P): Roger, appreciate it, thank-you. We're going to leave you for just a minute now; we'll let the company know.

(GC): Yeh say, this is AL again. I'm down here in a car

(P): Yeh, AL, we're all set you can head on back if you'd like and we appreciate your assistance in this thing, and we're going to crank the engines so you've probably heard me say he's indicated that he wants the show on the road so we're going to get her cranked up here and pick our clearance in the air.

(GC): Or maybe you can get him into down towards Portland he might get homesick and want to land there again, I don't know.

(P): Well we'll hope for something to happen here that's a; well we're going to, you go ahead and pull out. We're going to get cranked up here now. So we'll see you later.

(GC): Yes sir, thank-you very much and best of luck.

(P): Yeh.

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(GC): Now, LEE, if you're coming across you're clear to cross now.

(GC): Okay, we're coming across.

(GC): Coming across, overhead downstairs? He's starting now and we're going to have to show him direct Portland.

(GC): Okay.

(GC): On his planning does it look like he's going north?

(GC): No, he's going south, we'll get him on south

(unintel).

(CG): Northwest 305 I hear you on company frequency. Taxi on six right, you can do a one eighty and taxi back, and refer to Portland Vector 23, maintain 10,000 and remain in this freak until advised and transfer under 3100 until the other codes advises. Out.

(P): Okay, Northwest 305 will taxi back up three four left and will clear to Portland by Vector 23, maintain 10,000 and 3100 transponder code.

(GC): That's correct and checking the maps all the way down, and 305 checking on the maps Vector 23 all the way south the highest mountain is 10,000 that looks about like the best to get you down and that goes all the way into Sacramento at 10 or less.

(P): Okay, fine. We've advised the company that this may be the best approach to go. We haven't really had time to check it out but of course somewhere along the coast would be best. Our company indicates to us that, well you probably heard PAUL saying that it wouldn't add appreciably to our Reno way by going doglegging it.

(GC): Yeh, Vector 23 you're over the valley most of the way. ... most of the way so it might be Vector 23 all the

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(GC): way down. It looks to us like the best.

(P): Okay, fine that's alright as long as we got the

(UNINTEL) that's all that matters.

(GC): And 305 ground if enroute there's any problem on communications why don't we just clear you to Sacramento that looks a little bit longer than Reno not much. Let's clear you to Sacramento to maintain 10,000.

(P): Okay, clear to Sacramento and maintain 10,000. How about re-routing Vector 23. We haven't got the maps out here and haven't really had a chance to look at it.

(GC): That'll be Vector 23 all the way to Sacramento.

(P): Okay, that's easy enough and ground no force on 305 be advised that I will be trying to make her up to altitude any way we can here now before going the, if possible the said or any other restrictions that may be imposed upon us.

(GC): No restrictions at all. You fly in the best way you can do her.

(P): Thank-you.

(GC): And 305 there'll be people with you all the way down.

(P): I would certainly appreciate it. Thanks alot.

(GC): And that goes for many others of us too.

(GC): Roger.

(GC): Hello Northwest 305 when departure sends you over to center, the frequency of center will be 121.2.

(P): Okay, the Seattle center will be 121.2 Thank-you sir.

(GC): That's correct.

(GC): The report is seven here altimeters can be missed

4 000 feet if it would help you at all.

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- (P): I'm sorry say it again please.
- (GC): Altimeter can be missed at least 4,000 feet if it will help you.
- (P): Okay.
- (GC): And 305 another suggestion if you do get on top of 10,000 let center know because there's going to be people behind you and probably be trailing along with you.
- (P): Ground Northwest 305 we didn't answer you, we were talking with the company.
- (GC): Okay, you're going to have people following you all the way down so if you do get on top or where the visibility is good, you might advise center about it.
- (P): Okay, we will do that. Thank-you sir.
- (P): (UNINTEL) that's quite alright. It'll give us a chance to make a double check. We're not quite sure what our procedure is.
- (GC): Everybody except Northwest 305 clear the frequency and 305 you're cleared for takeoff when you're ready and the wind is 180 degrees, one zero, and the altimeter is 2991.
- (P): Okay 2991 do you want us on the right or left?
- (GC): The right one's fine. If you'd rather have the long one, the left one's fine. You can have it, it's your choice.
- (P): Okay, we'd just as soon take the long one.
- (GC): Okay, one six left declared for takeoff.
- (P): Roger, understand. Do you want us to stay with you on departure?
- (GC): This will be fine.

10

(P): Thank-you.

(GC): And 305 you are clear from configuration as far as the back steps?

(P): That's affirm.

(GC): Roger

(GC): Northwest 305, he wants to go to altitude as fast as he can go, so don't restrict him.

(GC): Okay.

(GC): And he's cleared to Sacramento. I don't know he may deviate on his own, he said he didn't know what, but he would go one way or the other to do whatever he needs.

(GC): Okay.

(GC): And if you got (UNINTEL) he may change altimeter to give him an extra program.

(GC): 31 we're going to go straight to center with him.

(GC): Northwest 305 are you going to go (UNINTEL). Okay

and if it looks good, good luck on it and contact center 121.2 . Squak (UNINTEL).

(GC): AL, LEE's off and running.

(GC): Three you might tell center he's dirty, he's got gear hanging and flaps down.

(GC): Roger Alpha 3.

(GC): Alpha 3 ground.

(GC): Off the end of the concourse let's cross one six left and go over and go over and check the end of one six right for any debris or anything that might be there.

- 191 -  
three go to the runway one six left and halt traffic

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(GC): over the touching down.

(GC): Roger.

(GC): Alpha 3 when vehicles cross over, go on to one six right.

(GC): Alpha 3 roger.

This ends re-recording Reel #5. The time at this point is approximately 0341 Greenwich. This concludes the reproduction of this recording pertaining to the alleged hijacking of Northwest Airlines Flight 305 on the 24th of November, 1971, at Seattle, Washington.

0337:11 NW 305  
(7:37 PM, PST)

Northwest three oh five we're ah

0337:17 SEA R2

Northwest three zero five ident verify assigned  
one zero thousand

0337:23 NW 305

(Unintelligible) three zero five

0339:43 SEA R2

Northwest three zero five say altitude now

0340:02 SEA R2

Northwest one zero correction Northwest three  
zero five say altitude please

0340:06 NW 305

Three oh five through sixty five hundred ah trying  
to get the steps down down back there ah

0340:37 NW 305

One oh five ah three oh five we're gonna level off  
here for a while at seven thousand he wants the  
steps down and ah we're gonna have er about down  
to a hundred and sixty knots

0340:48 SEA R2

Northwest three zero five roger

0344:22 SEA R2

Northwest three zero five advise if you change  
altitudes over

NW 305

Okay we'll hold at seven here we got the back steps  
down now and ah it looks like we aren't gonna be  
able to climb anymore ah we'll hold seven thousand

0344:34 SEA R2  
(7:44 P.M., PST)

Northwest three oh five roger

Page 2

0349:18 SEA R2  
(7:49 PM, PST)

Northwest three zero five in event of lost communications contact Seattle Center one three three point niner

0350:05 SEA R2

Northwest three zero five Toledo altimeter two niner niner eight

0351:31 NW 305

Center Northwest three oh five ah we're gonna climb out climbing up ah to ten thousand and ah we're through nine now

0351:42 SEA R2

Northwest three zero five roger report level at one zero thousand

NW 305

Roger

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0353:34 NW 305

Northwest three oh five we're leveling at ten thousand

SEA R2

Northwest three oh five roger

0353:40 NW 305

Airspeed in the vicinity of one seventy one eighty

SEA R2

Three oh five roger

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0359:10 SEA R2

Northwest three zero five contact Seattle Center one three three point niner

0359:15 NW 305

Ah one thirty three point nine

(7:59 P.M. PST)

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Page 3

0413:14 NW 305  
(8:13 PM, PST)

Center four oh five (unintelligible) twenty point  
nine ten thousand

SEA R5

Northwest three zero five ident

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0415:52

SEA R5

Northwest three zero five the Portland ah altimeter  
three zero zero three

NW 305

Zero zero three

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0433:36

SEA R5

Northwest three zero five contact Seattle Center  
one two five point eight

0433:46

NW 305

Twenty five point eight so long

SEA R5

Good day six

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0433:51

NW 305

Seattle Center Northwest three zero five ten  
thousand

0433:55

SEA R6

Northwest three zero five Seattle Center one zero  
thousand ident

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0445:45 SEA R6  
(8:45 PM - PST)

Northwest three zero five Eugene altimeter three  
zero zero six

NW 305

Ah one three zero point six